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Abstract
In this paper we study the eﬀects of providing additional feedback
about individual contributions and earnings on the dynamics of con-
tributions in a repeated public good game. We include treatments
where subjects can freely choose whether to obtain additional infor-
mation about individual contributions or individual earnings. We ﬁnd
that, in the aggregate, contributions decline less fast when additional
information about contributions and earnings is provided on top of
aggregate information. We also ﬁnd that there exist substantial but
intuitively appealing diﬀerences in the way individuals react to feed-
back. Particularly, individuals with a high propensity to contribute
tend to imitate the highest contributor more often and are more in-
clined to obtain feedback about individual contributions than about
individual earnings than individuals with a lower propensity to con-
tribute.
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11 Introduction
A recurrent theme in economic experiments is the study of cooperation in
situations where there is a tension between the interests of individuals and
the group. In public good experiments, for example, contributions mostly
start at a relatively high level and gradually decline over time, as the game
is being repeated. Given that it has recently been shown that this pattern of
contributions is caused by the existence of imperfect conditional cooperators
who match other players’ past contributions only partly (see Fischbacher
and G¨ achter, 2010), contributions and their dynamics might crucially de-
pend on the type of feedback received after each repetition. As suggested by
Nikiforakis (2010), whereas feedback about contributions might make more
salient the cooperative side of the dilemma, and thus particularly appeal to
conditional cooperators, feedback on individual earnings makes more preva-
lent the private beneﬁt of (not) contributing. For the design of institutions
aimed at increasing cooperation, e.g. contributions to a public good or eﬀort
in a team task, it is crucial to understand the potentially diﬀerential eﬀects
of the format of feedback provided to the individuals. Typically, participants
in public good experiments receive feedback about aggregate contributions
in their group after each round of play. We study whether and how provid-
ing additional feedback about past individual contributions and earnings of
group members, aﬀects contributions and the rate of their decline.
Two dynamics that have been suggested to play a role in repeated di-
lemma experiments where detailed feedback is provided are “imitation of
the best performer” (the lowest contributor) and “imitation of the good ex-
ample” (the highest contributor) (see e.g. Vega-Redondo, 1997; Selten and
Ostmann, 2001; Oﬀerman et al., 2002).1 If players imitate the lowest contrib-
utor, making information about past individual contributions and earnings
salient implies that ceteris paribus contributions decay faster in time and
that, as a potential consequence, they are lower on average. If, however,
players imitate the highest contributor, one should see a slower decline (or
even an increase) in contributions and, potentially, higher average contri-
butions when additional feedback is provided than when it is not provided.
Hence, it is not clear a priori how the pattern of contributions will be af-
fected by providing feedback about individual contributions and earnings on
1Another potential form of imitation, not within the scope of this paper, is imitation
of like-minded players in other groups (see, e.g., Apesteguia et al., 2007).
2top of aggregate information.2 Furthermore, additional confounds are likely
to be caused by diﬀerent types of players reacting diﬀerently to feedback. For
example, free riders—those who never contribute anything—react by deﬁni-
tion much less to information about past behavior of others than conditional
cooperators (see also Fischbacher et al., 2001, on conditional cooperation).
We report the results from an experiment that studies the eﬀects of pro-
viding additional feedback about individual contributions and earnings on
contributions in a public good game. In order to learn more about the mi-
crofoundations behind aggregate patterns of contributions, we include treat-
ments where individuals have the option to obtain additional feedback on
contributions and/or earnings. This allows us to study whether some types
of players are more interested in obtaining additional feedback, and whether
diﬀerent types of players are interested in diﬀerent pieces of information (con-
tributions or earnings). To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to let players
freely choose whether to acquire feedback about past individual contributions
or earnings.3
In our experiment contributions decline signiﬁcantly less fast when ad-
ditional information (about contributions and earnings) is provided on top
of aggregate information. We identify the extent to which the two imita-
tion forces are behind this pattern and show that diﬀerent types of players
imitate in diﬀerent ways. Particularly, “imitation of the best performer” is
relatively more common among players with a low to medium propensity
to cooperate, while “imitation of the good example” among players with
a high propensity to cooperate. Moreover, we ﬁnd that diﬀerent types of
players are interested in diﬀerent pieces of information. Speciﬁcally, players
with a medium to high propensity to contribute are more likely to choose
to obtain additional information about individual contributions as compared
to information about individual earnings, while players who have a very low
propensity to contribute are relatively more interested in individual earnings.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we give an overview of exper-
imental papers that study the eﬀect of providing additional feedback about
individual choices and earnings of group members on choices. In Section 3
we discuss our experimental design and the procedures. Section 4 presents
2If players would imitate the average (as in Huck et al., 2002), no eﬀect will be observed
of providing additional feedback.
3A similar approach was adopted in Bigoni (2010), where subjects could choose among
various pieces of feedback information, but in the diﬀerent framework of a repeated
Cournot oligopoly game.
3the experimental results and Section 5 concludes.
2 The eﬀect of additional feedback
The eﬀect of providing additional feedback about past choices and earnings of
other players in the group has been a topic of study in the context of quantity-
or price-setting games, which—like public good games—are characterized by
a tension between self-interest and group eﬃciency. Results of these studies
are mixed. The strongest support for the “imitation of the best performer”
hypothesis comes from the experimental Cournot markets reported by Huck
et al. (1999). They ﬁnd that in Cournot markets where information about
individual quantities and payoﬀs is provided, imitation of the best performer
is prominent and even dominates the force of the best-reply dynamics when
players have partial or no information about demand and cost conditions.
The consequence is that players’ choices are more competitive when addi-
tional information about individual quantities and earnings is provided com-
pared to a treatment with aggregate information.4 Oﬀerman et al. (2002)
also see players imitate the best performer in their treatment with informa-
tion about individual choices and earnings. However, they also point out the
importance of “imitation of the good example” because choices shift more
to either side of the Nash equilibrium (more competitive and more collu-
sive) compared to the benchmark with aggregate information.5 Finally, in
the Bertrand markets reported by Huck et al. (1999) no statistically signif-
icant diﬀerence in prices is obtained between treatments with and without
additional information about individual prices.6
Studies using the public good game in the lab have looked at the eﬀect
on cooperation of providing feedback solely on individual choices, or have
used other than aggregate feedback benchmarks. Sell and Wilson (1991),
for example, ﬁnd that providing feedback solely about individual choices
increases cooperation compared to the case with only aggregate information
(like Oﬀerman et al., 2002). In a similar information setting Croson (2001)
4A similar result is obtained in the Cournot treatments of Huck et al. (2000).
5Both imitation forces—imitation of the best performer and imitation of the good
example—are also at work in the experiment of Selten and Apesteguia (2005) on local price
competition. Bosch-Dom` enech and Vriend (2003) reject imitation of the best performer
in a duopoly experiment.
6Rassenti et al. (2000) do not ﬁnd a diﬀerence either, but the Nash equilibrium is not
stable in their game (and costs are asymmetric).
4does not ﬁnd a diﬀerence in the level of cooperation but points out a diﬀerence
in variability: it is higher when individual information about contributions
is provided. Nikiforakis (2010) ﬁnds that in a public goods game with a
punishment phase, providing feedback about individual contributions alone
increases contributions and reverses the decline in time compared to cases
where individual earnings are included. Finally, no eﬀect at all is obtained by
Weimann (1994) in a public good experiment with feedback about individual
contributions and earnings, compared to a benchmark with information on
the player’s own payoﬀ and the average contribution in the group.
Albeit results from these studies are mixed, the following two general ten-
dencies can be recovered. First, providing feedback about individual choices
(but not earnings) tends to increase cooperation. Second, providing feedback
about individual earnings (but not choices) tends to decrease cooperation.
3 Experimental design and procedure
The experiment was run in June and September 2008 in CentERlab at
Tilburg University with a total of 57 subjects, mainly from the ﬁeld of eco-
nomics.7 After being randomly seated at a computer terminal, participants
received written instructions (see Appendix A).8 To make sure that the par-
ticipants understood the instructions, they had to correctly answer a number
of control questions before the experiment could start.
The experiment consisted of three parts. Instructions for the last two
parts were only given on the computer screens at the time the concerned
part started. In each of the three parts participants were grouped with two
other participants to play 10 rounds of a linear public good game. Groups
were reshuﬄed after each part such that participants would never meet again
in another part.9 In all parts, the payoﬀ of participant i who contributes in
period t an amount of xi to the public good is calculated as follows:




7The fact that mainly economics students are included in the participant pool does not
lead to a diﬀerent aggregate pattern of contributions than the one typically observed in
public good experiments.
8We used z-Tree software (see Fischbacher, 2007) to program the experiment.
9This implies that groups can be considered as independent observations in Part One,
but not so in Part Two and Part Three.
5In order to examine whether providing individual information about the
other group members’ contributions and earnings leads to diﬀerent contribu-
tion behavior as in the case where only aggregate information is provided, we
have two main conditions: AggrIndi and IndiAggr. In condition AggrIndi, at
the end of each of the periods of Part One participants received information
about the total amount contributed in their group in that period. In Part
Two, at the end of every period participants also received information about
individual contributions and earnings of each of the three group members,
in addition to aggregate information about the group’s contribution.10 In
the second main condition, referred to as IndiAggr, the order of the feedback
conditions was reversed. That is, in Part One subjects received information
both about the aggregate group’s contribution, and about group members’
individual contributions and earnings, while in Part Two they only received
information at the aggregate level. This design allows us to study diﬀerences
in behavior depending on the feedback between and within treatments.
In Part Three of the experiment, the subjects received aggregate informa-
tion and had the choice to obtain (costless) additional individual information
by clicking on a button on the computer screen.11 We let subjects choose
to see additional information in Part Three in order to learn more about
who actually wanted to obtain individual information. Is it the (conditional)
cooperators or rather the defectors who obtain additional individual informa-
tion? Is there a relation between choosing to obtain individual information
and contributions?
In Part Three of treatments AggrIndi1 and IndiAggr1, at the end of
each period participants had a choice to either not see additional individual
information or to see individual contributions and earnings. In Part Three
of treatments AggrIndi2 and IndiAggr2 participants had a choice to either
not see additional individual information, to see individual contributions or
to see individual earnings.12 The latter treatments allow us to study whether
subjects mostly choose to obtain information about individual contributions
10Appendix B contains a print of an example of the screen that was shown to subjects
in the case they received additional individual information.
11The initial conditions in Part Three of the experiment are the same across AggrIndi
and IndiAggr. At the point that subjects made their choices in Part One and Part Two,
they did not have the instructions for Part Three. They only knew that there would be a
third part.
12The computer screens included two buttons: one that would reveal information about
individual contributions and one that would reveal information about individual earnings.
6Table 1: Experimental design
# # #
Type of feedback Participants Groups Indep. obs.
AggrIndi
Part One Aggregate 30 10 10
Part Two Aggregate + individual 30 10 3
Part Three
AggrIndi1 Aggregate + optional individual
contributions and earnings 18 6 2∗
AggrIndi2 Aggregate + optional individual
contributions or earnings 12 4 1
IndiAggr
Part One Aggregate + individual 27 9 9
Part Two Aggregate 27 9 2
Part Three
IndiAggr1 Aggregate + optional individual
contributions and earnings 15 5 1
IndiAggr2 Aggregate + optional individual
contributions or earnings 12 4 1
∗ In this session, the 18 participants were split into two matching groups of 9, so that each
subject never interacted with subjects in the other matching group. For this reason, the
two matching groups can be considered as two independent observations.
or about individual earnings and to which extent these choices are related to
decision-making and patterns observed in the repeated public good game.
Table 1 gives an overview of the four treatments (AggrIndi1, IndiAggr1,
AggrIndi2 and IndiAggr2) included in the experiment.
4 Results
We start our discussion in Subsection 4.1 by performing a between-treatments
comparison of behavior in Part One and Part Two of the experiment. In
Subsection 4.2 we identify the importance of each of the imitation theories
discussed previously (“imitate the best performer” and “imitate the good
example”) and relate the extent to which players follow a certain imitation
7process to their general propensity to cooperate. Finally, in Subsection 4.3
we analyze the results of Part Three of the experiment, in which players
were free to choose whether to receive or not receive additional information
on individual earnings and/or contributions. We relate the choice of feedback
in Part Three to the players’ general propensity to cooperate.
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the evolution of the average contribution in Part One (periods 1
to 10) and Part Two (periods 11 to 20) of the experiment.
Figure 1: Average contribution per period
4.1 The eﬀect of additional feedback on contributions
Figure 1 depicts how average contributions evolve in Part One (period 1 to
10) and Part Two (periods 11 to 20) of the experiment, in each of the two
feedback conditions. The ﬁgure shows that in our experiment the typical
pattern of contributions decaying in time is recovered. In the case where
additional individual information is provided in Part One (IndiAggr), the
8average contribution starts at a level above 5 and decreases to a level below
2. In the case where only aggregate information is provided (AggrIndi), the
average contribution decreases from above 4 to almost 0. Similar patterns
are observed in Part Two. Also, in line with previous studies, a signiﬁcant
restart eﬀect is observed at the beginning of Part Two, in period 11 (see, for
example, Andreoni, 1988; Croson, 1996).
The ﬁgure also reports the p-values obtained from Mann-Whitney-U tests
based on independent observations (groups) in periods 1, 5 and 10 (in Part
One).13 These numbers indicate that, in the beginning of the game, the
diﬀerence between both treatments is statistically not signiﬁcant and, as the
game proceeds, the statistical signiﬁcance grows. In the ﬁnal period of the
game, the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure 1 only displays the average level of contribution per period, but it
does not tell us anything about how contributions are distributed. A closer
look at the data reveals that most of the subjects (almost 60%) choose ex-
treme contributions, either 0 or 10 (to illustrate, see Appendix C). Figure 2
provides additional insights about the eﬀects of individual feedback on how
contributions are distributed. It shows that when subjects receive informa-
tion about past individual contributions and earnings of the other group
members, they tend to choose the maximum possible contribution substan-
tially more often, while the pace of increase in the number of subjects con-
tributing nothing is slower.14
In order to study whether the eﬀect of additional information on the
rate of decline of contributions is statistically signiﬁcant, we conducted a
regression analysis where the dependent variable is a subject’s individual
contribution to the public good. We include data from Part One and Part
Two of the experiment. The independent variables comprise a dummy called
“Individual feedback” which equals one when additional feedback on individ-
ual contributions and earnings is provided (i.e., in condition IndiAggr) and
zero when only aggregate feedback is provided (i.e., in condition AggrIndi).
Also included are a linear time trend (measured by the period number) and
13The reason why we only include p-values for Part One is that only in this part, groups
can be seen as independent observations.
14According to the results of two logit regressions, the positive eﬀect of individual feed-
back on the fraction of subjects choosing the maximum contribution is signiﬁcant (at the
1% level) only in Part Two of the experiment, while the negative eﬀect on the rate of
growth of the fraction of subjects contributing nothing is signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) both
in Part One, and in Part Two.
9Note: The ﬁgure depicts the evolution of the frequency of subjects choosing to contribute
10 or 0 in Part One (periods 1 to 10) and Part Two (periods 11 to 20) of the experiment.
Figure 2: Percentage of subjects contributing all or nothing.
an interaction term of these two regressors. To verify whether the eﬀects of
the feedback condition and the time trend are diﬀerent in Part One and Part
Two of the experiment, we include a dummy taking value one for Part Two
of the experiment and zero for Part One, and its interactions with the three
regressors mentioned above. Table 2 contains the results from an ordered
probit regression including random eﬀects at the subject level.15 Standard
errors are robust to potential interdependence within independent observa-
15The choice of an ordered probit model was dictated by the consideration that the
dependent variable is highly concentrated at extreme values. Moreover, the eﬀect of having
additional feedback about individual contributions and earnings is not linear: it mainly
aﬀects the extreme contributions (see also Appendix C). Therefore, a linear regression
does not capture the eﬀect.
10tions (sessions).16
Results in Table 2 provide support for what we previously observed about
the dynamics in contributions across treatments. Receiving additional feed-
back on individual choices and earnings of all group members does not aﬀect
the level of the players’ contributions to the public good in a statistically
signiﬁcant way. However, it does signiﬁcantly reduce the rate of decline of
the contributions.17 The individual feedback dummy variable is not signiﬁ-
Table 2: Feedback and level of contributions in Part One and Part
Two
Dependent variable: Contribution
Independent variables Coeﬃcient (S.E.) p-value
Part Two 0.205*** (0.024) < 0.001
Individual feedback (Part One) 0.096 (0.310) 0.757
Individual feedback (Part Two) -0.273 (0.322) 0.396
Period (Part One) -0.241*** (0.042) < 0.001
Period (Part Two) -0.296*** (0.055) < 0.001
Individual feedback x Period (Part One) 0.108** (0.055) 0.050
Individual feedback x Period (Part Two) 0.137*** (0.051) 0.007
N 1140
log-likelihood -1796.1
Note: The table reports results from an ordered probit panel regression that includes
random eﬀects at the subject level. The regression is based on data from Part One and
Part Two of the experiment. Standard errors are robust to potential dependency within
independent observations (sessions).
cantly diﬀerent from zero in neither of the parts. In both parts, a negative
and signiﬁcant time trend in contributions emerges. The terms that mea-
sure the interaction between the linear time trend, the individual feedback
16All regressions are performed using GLLAMM (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004).
Also, * denotes signiﬁcance at the 10-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level and *** at
the 1-percent level.
17In this regression and in the ones reported below we always check whether the time
trend is potentially non-linear by including the square of the period number among the
regressors. When this squared term is not statistically signiﬁcant, we only present results
from regressions where it has been dropped.
11dummy, and the Part One and Part Two dummies, instead, are both posi-
tive and highly signiﬁcant.18 This implies that, in both Part One and Part
Two, contributions decrease to a lesser extent when additional individual
feedback is provided. Therefore, we can conclude that the eﬀect of providing
additional feedback on contributions and earnings is the same, regardless of
whether players experience the individual feedback condition before or after
the aggregate feedback condition. Our ﬁrst result is summarized as follows.
Result 1 When subjects receive additional feedback about other players’ in-
dividual contributions and earnings, the pace at which contributions decrease
is signiﬁcantly slower than when only aggregate feedback is provided.
4.2 Information and imitation
The result that detailed information on other players’ past choices and earn-
ings slows down the rate of decline in contributions could imply that players
imitate the highest contributor more often when additional feedback about
individual contributions and earnings is provided than when it is not pro-
vided. In this subsection we investigate whether this is indeed the case by
studying the relative importance of each of the imitation processes “imitate
the best performer” and “imitate the good example”. For this purpose, we
follow an approach similar to the one adopted by Huck et al. (1999) and
estimate the following equation:
cit − cit−1 = β0 + β1Dminit + β2Dmaxit, (2)
where cit denotes subject’s i contribution in period t, and Dminit represents
the diﬀerence between the lowest contribution in the group in the previous pe-
riod and subject’s i contribution in the current period, and Dmaxit represents
the diﬀerence between the highest contribution in the group in the previous
period and subject’s i contribution in the current period. A subject who
strictly imitates the best performer would have β1 = 1 and βk = 0, k  = 1.
Analogously, a subject imitating the good example would have β2 = 1 and
βk = 0, k  = 2. To summarize, β1 and β2 measure the relative importance of
imitation of the best performer and imitation of the good example.19
18The estimated coeﬃcients of the two variables are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. A stan-
dard t-test yields a p-value of 0.529.
19We do not include “imitation of the average” because the average is highly correlated
with the minimum and the maximum, which causes problems of multicollinearity in the
regression.
12Given that providing additional feedback about individual contributions
and earnings has similar eﬀects in Part One and Part Two of the experiment,
we estimate equation 2 on the basis of pooled data from Part One and Part
Two.20 In order to see whether the weight of each of the imitation processes
is aﬀected by the feedback condition, we include a dummy in the regression
indicating whether additional feedback about individual earnings is provided
or not, and its interactions with Dminit and Dmaxit. Results are displayed
in Table 3.
The estimated coeﬃcients related to Dmin and Dmax indicate the impor-
tance of the imitation processes when only aggregate feedback is provided.21
The estimated coeﬃcients related to the interaction of Dmin and Dmax with
the individual feedback dummy indicate the extent to which the aggregate
weights of the imitation processes change by providing individual feedback.
Table 3 shows that the coeﬃcients of Dmin and Dmax have the expected
sign and are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that changes in contribu-
tions in time seem to be driven at least to some extent by one of the imi-
tation processes. Particularly, “imitate the best performer” gets the highest
weight overall, signiﬁcantly higher than the weight of “imitate the good ex-
ample”.22 Interestingly, the interaction of the individual feedback dummy
with Dmax has a positive sign and is signiﬁcant, while this is not the case for
the interaction with Dmin. This clearly suggests that the force of “imitate
the good example” is stronger—while not so the force of “imitate the best
performer”—when additional feedback about individual contributions and
earnings is provided than when only feedback about aggregate contributions
20For each i and t, only data points are included for which Dminit  = Dmaxit because
for Dminit = Dmaxit the imitation process cannot be identiﬁed. This gives 726 (out of
1026) data points.
21One might argue that when subjects are not provided with individual information
about past contributions and earnings, it is not possible for them to imitate the best
performer or the good example, which makes including Dmin and Dmax per se redundant.
However, subjects may form beliefs about the distribution of contributions in their group
and act according to these beliefs. Moreover, there is a methodological reason for including
Dmin and Dmax. That is, we are interested in explaining the diﬀerence in dynamics
between conditions with aggregate and detailed feedback, particularly, in studying the
relative importance of both imitation processes for explaining the diﬀerence.
22The estimated coeﬃcient of Dmin is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one of Dmax,
and the sum of the estimated coeﬃcients of Dmin and Individual feedback x Dmin is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the sum of Dmax and Individual feedback x Dmax (both with
p < 0.001).
13Table 3: Imitation
Dependent variable: cit − cit−1
Independent variables Coeﬃcient (S.E.) p-value
Constant -0.294*** (0.076) < 0.001
Dmin 0.490*** (0.033) < 0.001
Dmax 0.215*** (0.036) < 0.001
Individual feedback 0.059 (0.177) 0.737
Individual feedback x Dmin -0.004 (0.030) 0.896
Individual feedback x Dmax 0.099*** (0.027) < 0.001
N 726
Log-likelihood -1625.4
Notes: The table reports the results from a panel regression of equation 2 that includes
random eﬀects at the subject level. The regression is based on data from Part One and
Part Two of the experiment. Standard errors are robust to potential dependency within
independent observations (sessions).
is provided.
In a pooled analysis it is assumed that all players adopt the same “hy-
brid” model of imitation. However, this is not necessarily the case. Diﬀerent
players might follow diﬀerent models. In order to examine whether diﬀerent
imitation processes are used by diﬀerent types of players, we deﬁne types of
players according to their general propensity for contributing. We measure
the players’ general propensity for contributing by their contributions in pe-
riod 1 of Part One.23 The reason is that in period 1, players have not yet
interacted with others and social learning has thus not yet set in. On the
basis of these contributions, we sort players into ﬁve classes of types.24 The
distribution of players in these ﬁve classes is presented in Table 4.
Then we created a dummy variable for each of these ﬁve classes, and
interacted it with a dummy that indicates whether additional feedback about
individual contributions and earnings is provided and with both regressors in
23Contributions in period 1 of Part One are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across treatments
AggrIndi and IndiAggr, according to a two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test (α = 0.10, n1=30,
n2=27).
24Given that the subjects play a repeated game within each part of the experiment—the
composition of the groups does not change—these general propensities for contributing do
not necessarily fall together with social preferences to cooperate.
14Table 4: Types of players
Type Contribution in period 1 Freq. Percent Cum.
1 0 10 17.54 17.54
2 1 to 4 13 22.81 40.35
3 5 14 24.56 64.91
4 6 to 9 10 17.54 82.46
5 10 10 17.54 100
Total 57 100
Notes: The table provides data on the distribution of the types of players. Types of
players are deﬁned according to their general propensity to contribute proxied by their
contribution in period 1.
equation 2. This allows us to study whether diﬀerent types of players react
to information in diﬀerent ways under both feedback regimes. Results are
displayed in Table 5.
Table 5 shows that under the aggregate feedback condition, imitation of
the best performer gets the highest weight for all types of players. However,
under the individual feedback condition, diﬀerences emerge among diﬀerent
types of players. On the one hand, Type-3 players (who contribute 5 in
period 1) imitate the best performer more often when additional feedback
about individual contributions and earnings is provided. On the other hand,
for Type-4 and Type-5 players (who contribute more than 5 in period 1)
the importance of “imitate the good example” is increased signiﬁcantly by
providing additional feedback. Particularly for Type-4 players “imitate the
good example” is a more important force than “imitate the best performer”
in the case additional feedback is provided. For Type-1 and Type-2 players
(who contribute below 5 in period 1), adding individual information does
not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on their imitation behavior. Overall, for these
players, the weight of “imitate the best performer” is higher than the one of
“imitate the good example”. We summarize our second result as follows.
Result 2 “Imitation of the good example” becomes relatively more important
compared to “imitation of the best performer” when feedback about individual
contributions and earnings is provided than when only aggregate information
is provided. This eﬀect is driven by players with a high general propensity to
15Table 5: Imitation and types of players
Dependent variable: cit − cit−1
Independent variables Coeﬃcient (S.E.) p-value
Type 1 x Dmin 0.532*** (0.173) 0.002
Type 2 x Dmin 0.611*** (0.182) 0.001
Type 3 x Dmin 0.354*** (0.071) < 0.001
Type 4 x Dmin 0.462*** (0.057) < 0.001
Type 5 x Dmin 0.605*** (0.133) < 0.001
Type 1 x Dmin x Individual feedback -0.027 (0.247) 0.912
Type 2 x Dmin x Individual feedback 0.036 (0.084) 0.669
Type 3 x Dmin x Individual feedback 0.228*** (0.064) < 0.001
Type 4 x Dmin x Individual feedback -0.005 (0.176) 0.980
Type 5 x Dmin x Individual feedback -0.231 (0.179) 0.195
Type 1 x Dmax 0.160** (0.073) 0.030
Type 2 x Dmax 0.327** (0.131) 0.013
Type 3 x Dmax 0.381*** (0.104) < 0.001
Type 4 x Dmax 0.229*** (0.054) < 0.001
Type 5 x Dmax 0.043 (0.050) 0.368
Type 1 x Dmax x Individual feedback -0.006 (0.096) 0.954
Type 2 x Dmax x Individual feedback -0.095 (0.165) 0.564
Type 3 x Dmax x Individual feedback 0.033 (0.130) 0.800
Type 4 x Dmax x Individual feedback 0.403*** (0.142) 0.005
Type 5 x Dmax x Individual feedback 0.323*** (0.119) 0.007
N 726
Log-likelihood -1605.4
Notes: The table reports the results from a panel regression of equation 2 that includes
random eﬀects at the subject level. The regression is based on data from Part One
and Part Two of the experiment. The independent variables are the type dummies as
deﬁned in Table 4, their interactions with an individual feedback dummy, their interactions
with Dmin and Dmax as deﬁned in Table 3, and their interactions with the individual
feedback dummy and Dmin and Dmax. For convenience, only the estimations related
to the interactions with Dmin and Dmax are included in the table. Standard errors are
robust to potential dependency within independent observations (sessions).
16contribute.
4.3 Choice of feedback condition
In Part Three of the experiment, obtaining additional feedback on individual
contributions and/or earnings was optional. In AggrIndi1 and IndiAggr1,
players who chose to receive individual feedback were informed both about
individual earnings and individual contributions. In AggrIndi2 and Indi-
Aggr2 we asked players to choose between not getting any type of additional
individual feedback, getting feedback on individual contributions only, or
getting feedback on individual earnings only. This choice was made at the
end of each period. We have 10 data points per subject, which adds up to
330 data points for AggrIndi1 and IndiAggr1, and to 240 for AggrIndi2 and
IndiAggr2.
As in Subsection 4.2, we use the players’ contributions in period 1 as a
proxy for the players’ types related to the general propensity for contributing.
We investigate the relation between the types of players and their interest in
the diﬀerent pieces of information available in Part Three.
Figure 3 displays the relation between a subject’s type and the percent-
age of times one chooses to obtain additional feedback about individual con-
tributions and/or earnings. The left graph refers to treatments AggrIndi1
and IndiAggr1 where additional feedback about individual contributions and
earnings could be obtained. The right graph refers to treatments AggrIndi2
and IndiAggr2 where additional feedback about individual contributions or
earnings could be obtained. The ﬁgure shows that the relation between in-
formation acquisition and the players’ types is not linear. Speciﬁcally, the
relation seems to have an inverted U-shape. For AggrIndi1 and IndiAggr1
we see that “middle” types, i.e. those players who have a “medium” propen-
sity to contribute, look more at additional feedback about contributions and
earnings than “low” and “high” types. This makes sense if the middle types
are guided relatively more by contributions of other players than other types,
i.e., if they are conditional cooperators.
The graph based on data from treatments AggrIndi2 and IndiAggr2 shows
that those players who contribute nothing in period 1 are more interested
in individual earnings than in individual contributions. For players who
contribute something in period 1, however, the opposite holds: they are more
interested in individual contributions than in individual earnings. Especially
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Notes: The ﬁgure depicts the relation between a subject’s type (proxied by the contribu-
tion in period 1) and the percentage of times one chooses to obtain additional feedback.
The left graph refers to treatments AggrIndi1 and IndiAggr1 where additional feedback
about individual contributions and earnings could be obtained. The right graph refers to
treatments AggrIndi2 and IndiAggr2 where additional feedback about individual contri-
butions or earnings could be obtained.
Figure 3: Percentages of individual feedback choice in Part Three
18often at individual contributions than at individual earnings.
Next, we report the results of regressions that support the graphical vi-
sualization. Table 6 reports the result of a logit regression where the choice
whether or not to receive information on individual contributions and feed-
back in Part Three of treatments IndiAggr1 and AggrIndi1 is the dependent
variable and the independent variables are the type dummies as deﬁned in
Table 4. Also included are Period and Period2 in order to control for a
possibly non-linear time trend. Type-1 players serve as a benchmark. The
Table 6: Additional feedback and types of players
Dependent variable:
Feedback vs. No Feedback
Independent variables Coeﬃcient (S.E.) p-value
Constant 4.947*** (0.984) < 0.001
Type 2 0.319 (1.467) 0.828
Type 3 2.543* (1.493) 0.089
Type 4 1.002 (1.595) 0.530
Type 5 0.006 (1.633) 0.997
Period -1.433*** (0.243) < 0.001
Period2 0.066*** (0.025) 0.009
N. obs. 570
Log-likelihood -255.3
Notes: The table reports results from a logit regression where the dependent variable takes
value 1 when the player chose to obtain feedback about individual contributions or earn-
ings, and takes value 0 otherwise. The regression includes random eﬀects at the subject
and the group level. The regression is based on data from Part Three of the experiment.
Standard errors are robust to potential dependency within independent observations (ses-
sions).
results in Table 6 conﬁrm that the relation between the general propensity
to contribute and the choice to obtain additional feedback indeed has an
inverted U-shape. Type-3 players choose (weakly) signiﬁcantly more often
to obtain additional feedback than Type-1 players, and than Type-2 players
(p = 0.015 in the latter case). Other diﬀerences between type dummies are
not statistically signiﬁcant, however.
19Table 7 reports the result of a logit regression based on data in Part
Three of IndiAggr2 and AggrIndi2. The dependent variable is, given that one
chooses to obtain additional feedback, the choice whether to receive infor-
mation on individual contributions or individual earnings. The independent
variables are again the type dummies as deﬁned in Table 4, and Period and
Period2. Also, Type-1 players serve again as a benchmark.
Table 7: Additional feedback on contributions or earnings and
types of players
Dependent variable:
Request of information about
Contributions vs. Earnings
Independent variables Coeﬃcient (S.E.) p-value
Constant -2.903 (3.190) 0.363
Type 2 3.326 (2.816) 0.238
Type 3 3.055* (1.744) 0.080
Type 4 3.916** (1.606) 0.015
Type 5 3.048*** (1.163) 0.009
Period 0.487 (0.837) 0.561
Period2 -0.053 (0.057) 0.344
N. obs. 133
Log-likelihood -68.8
Notes: The table reports results from a logit regression where the dependent variable
takes value 1 when the player chose to obtain feedback about individual contributions,
and takes value 0 when the player chose to obtain feedback about individual earnings,
given that the player chose to obtain additional information. The regression includes
random eﬀects at the subject and the group level and is based on data from Part Three
of treatments IndiAggr2 and AggrIndi2 of the experiment. Standard errors are robust to
potential dependency within independent observations (sessions).
Table 7 also conﬁrms that players whose propensity to contribute is above
0 in period 1 are more interested in receiving information about individual
contributions than about individual earnings. For Type-3, Type-4, and Type-
5 players the diﬀerence with Type-1 players is statistically signiﬁcant.
We summarize our ﬁnal result as follows.
20Result 3 Players who have a general propensity to contribute above zero fa-
vor feedback about individual contributions as compared to individual earnings
more than players who have a general propensity to contribute of zero.
5 Conclusive remarks
In our experiment we ﬁnd that contributions decline less fast when infor-
mation about contributions and earnings of group members in the previous
period is provided on top of aggregate information. We ﬁnd that imitation
of the best performer is relatively more common among players with a low
propensity to cooperate, while imitation of the highest contributor among
players with a higher propensity to cooperate. Moreover, we ﬁnd that diﬀer-
ent types of players are interested in diﬀerent pieces of information, and that
the endogenous choice of information is correlated with the type of players.
Speciﬁcally, players with a medium to high propensity to contribute are more
likely to obtain additional information about past individual contributions
than about earnings.
Our results ﬁt well with the ﬁnding of Nikiforakis (2010) that coopera-
tion decreases faster when information about individual earnings is provided
than in cases where information about individual contributions is provided.
Whereas feedback about individual contributions makes more salient the co-
operation side of the dilemma, feedback about individual earnings makes
more prevalent the private beneﬁt of (not) contributing. We go a step fur-
ther by showing that diﬀerent types of players select diﬀerent types of infor-
mation. Speciﬁcally, uncooperative players—players who do not contribute
anything in the ﬁrst period of play—look relatively more often at individ-
ual earnings as compared to individual contributions than more cooperative
types of players.
Furthermore, our ﬁndings can provide an explanation for the diﬀerence
that exists at ﬁrst sight between the results obtained by Weimann (1994)—
who does not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the contributions’ trend across
treatments with and without additional individual feedback—and by Sell
and Wilson (1991) and Croson (2001)—who ﬁnd that providing players with
feedback on past individual contributions induces signiﬁcant behavioral dif-
ferences as compared to treatments with aggregate information. The reason
behind this discordance might lay in an apparently minor diﬀerence in the
design: while in his treatment with individual feedback, Weimann (1994) pro-
21vides players with feedback on both individual contributions and earnings,
Sell and Wilson (1991) (and also Croson, 2001) provide feedback on indi-
vidual contributions only and not on earnings. Our results show that these
two feedback formats have diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent types of players, which
might have counterbalanced each other in Weimann (1994)’s experiment, but
much less so in Sell and Wilson (1991)’s.
Our results call for further research on the behavioral impact of diﬀerent
feedback formats on subjects’ actions. If our ﬁndings were to be conﬁrmed,
and their external validity supported by future lab and ﬁeld experiments,
they might have relevant policy implications. In situations in which indi-
vidual and collective interest collide—such as team production, voluntary
contribution to a public good, or use of common pool resources—the provi-
sion of detailed information about individual actions may be beneﬁcial, as it
induces those who are more incline to pro-social behavior to persist. On the
contrary, putting emphasis on individual proﬁts may accelerate the collapse
of cooperation, by leading less cooperative individuals to focus even more on
their own interest.
22Appendix A: Instructions
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision making and
will be asked to make a number of decisions. If you follow the instructions
carefully, you can earn money. At the end of the experiment, you will be
paid your earnings in private and in cash.
The experiment is strictly anonymous: that is, your identity will not be
revealed to others and the identity of others will not be revealed to you.
You are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a
question, raise your hand and one of us will help you.
During the experiment your earnings will be expressed in points. Points
will be converted to Eur at the following rate: 30 points = 1.00 EUR.
The experiment consists of three parts. The instructions below are those
for the ﬁrst part. Later on, you will receive instructions for the other parts.
In the experiment, participants are divided into groups of 3. You will
therefore be in a group with 2 other participants.
The ﬁrst part of the experiment is divided into 10 periods. At the be-
ginning of each period you receive 10 points. In each period you decide how
many points you want to contribute to a project and how many points you
want to keep for yourself. You can allocate your 10 points in any way be-
tween the project and yourself. All participants in your group have the same
decision to make. The composition of the groups will remain the same during
the 10 periods.
In each period, for every point you contribute to the project, the earnings
of all participants in your group (including your own) increase by 0.5 points.
For every point you keep for yourself, your earnings increase by 1 point
and the earnings of others do not change. Note that the same is true for
other participants. Every point another participant contributes to the project
increases your earnings by 0.5 points. If instead he/she keeps that point for
him/herself, your earnings remain unchanged.
Your total earnings in points in each period are thus calculated as follows:
0.5 x (sum of points contributed by all 3 group members) + points you keep
Examples:
• If you contribute all your 10 points to the project and each of the other
2 group members keeps all their 10 points for him/herself, you earn 0.5
x 10 = 5 points.
• If you contribute nothing to the project and each of the other 2 group
23members contribute all their 10 points, you earn 10 + 0.5 x (10 + 10)
= 20 points.
• If you and the other 2 group members contribute all their 10 points to
the project, you earn 0.5 x (10 + 10 + 10) = 15 points.
After each period, you receive feedback about the sum of contributions
of all members of your group in that period.
24Appendix B: Screenshot
Figure 4: Screen shown to the subjects when they received infor-
mation about individual contributions and earnings.
25Appendix C: Frequency distribution of contri-
butions
Note: The ﬁgure depicts the frequency distribution of contributions in Part One (periods
1 to 10) and Part Two (periods 11 to 20) of the experiment by condition.
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